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Economics Leadership

Japan GDP growth first quarter 2017 – Gerhard Fasol interviewed by Rico Hizon on BBC TV

Japan’s economy grows five quarters in a row, and Japan Post books losses of YEN 400.33 billion (US$ 3.6 billion) for an acquisition in Australia

by Gerhard Fasol

Japan GDP growth first quarter 2017, growth of 2%/year. Still, Japan’s economy is the same size as in 2000, while countries like France, Germany, UK today are double the size as in the year 2000

Japan GDP growth first quarter 2017: We have seen 5 quarters of economic growth in Japan, for the January-March 2017 quarter the consensus is that the Japanese Government is likely to announce economic growth corresponding to an annual growth rate of around 2%/year (update: Japan’s Government announced an annual growth rate of 2.2%/year).

Generally the business mood in Japan is optimistic now, personal consumption and industrial orders are growing. We see investments in preparation for the 2020 Olympics. Venture start-ups and venture investments are growing, while still at a low level, we see venture businesses developing not only in Tokyo, but also in regional centers around Japan.

One mid-term risk to Japan GDP growth is the potential implementation of the postponed consumption tax rate increase.

The big picture however is, Japan’s economy today is approximately the same size as 17 years ago in 2000. During the same 17 years most major economies, e.g. France, Germany, UK have doubled in size. France, Germany, UK’s economies today are about twice the size as in 2000, while Japan’s economy today is about the same size as in 2000. Quarterly GDP figures just measure the short term fluctuations of this long term behavior.

Rico Hizon: so what would Japan have to do to restart long term growth?

Gerhard Fasol’s answer

Japan would have to do three things to restart economic growth long term:

  1. Population: Implement policies to make it easier for families to have children, shift spending from the aged to children, improve eduction, shorter work hours, build children’s day care centers, gender equality
  2. Implement Prime Minister Abe’s “third arrow”, the reforms. Deregulation not just in a few “special zones” but nation wide.
  3. Improve corporate governance to improve company’s growth, globalization and management.

Japan Post trips up on globalization: books YEN 400.33 (US$ 3.6 billion) losses due to an acquisition in Australia – with a Toshiba connection

Japan Post announced a loss of YEN 400.33 (US$ 3.6 billion), and a resulting net loss of YEN 28.98 billion (US$ 260 million) for the fiscal year ending March 31, 2017.

Japan Post Holdings was launched on the Tokyo Stock Exchange with the IPO on Nov 4, 2015.

Investors expect major growth of Japan Post Holdings into a global business, such as Deutsche Post has with privatization and later the acquisition and merger with the global logistics group DH about 20 years ago.

Around the time of the IPO Japan Post announced the acquisition of the Australian logistics group Toll for about YEN 620 billion (US$ 5.5 billion), while Toll’s market cap previous to the acquisition was about YEN 410 billion (US$ 3.7 billion).

Japan Post’s recent write-down at Toll is about equal its pre-acquisition market cap, or about 65% of the acquisition prize.

The deep problem of Japan Post’s steep write-downs at the Australian acquisition Toll, is that this casts doubts on Japan Post’s developments into a global business.

The Toshiba connection: Japan Post’s former CEO, Taizo Nishimuro (西室 泰三), previously served as CEO and Chairman of Toshiba

CEO of Japan Post at the time of the questionable Toll acquisition was no other than Mr Taizo Nishimuro (西室 泰三), former CEO and Chairman of Toshiba, now honorary advisor of Toshiba, who spent all his career at Toshiba, working at Toshiba since 1961. Toshiba is currently in severe difficulties caused primarily by Toshiba’s acquisitions of US nuclear construction firms, however Toshiba’s fundamental problems go back much much longer.

Japan Post Holding [6178]

Japan Post Holdings was founded on 23 January 2006, following the path to privatization initiated by Prime Minister Koizumi of Japan’s national Post Office.

Japan Post Holdings is listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (No. 6178), IPO was on 4 November 2015, and has five divisions:

  1. Japan Post Service (日本郵便株式会社): mail delivery
  2. Japan Post Network (郵便局株式会社): Post Offices = retail and real estate
  3. Japan Post Bank (株式会社ゆうちょ銀行): Tokyo Stock Exchange No. 7182
  4. Japan Post Insurance (株式会社かんぽ生命保険): life insurance. Tokyo Stock Exchange No. 7181
  5. Toll Holdings: logistics

Copyright (c) 2017 by Eurotechnology Japan. All Rights Reserved.

Categories
Economics Leadership

Women determine Japan’s future – Bill Emmott and Gerhard Fasol discuss Japan’s future

Bill Emmott and Gerhard Fasol about the future of Japan and the power of Japanese women

Bill Emmott is an independent writer and consultant on international affairs, board director, and from 1993 until 2006 was editor of The Economist. http://www.billemmott.com

Gerhard Fasol is physicist, board director, entrepreneur, M&A advisor in Tokyo. http://fasol.com/

women determine Japan’s future: A conversation about Japan’s future

Bill Emmott:

I came first to Japan in 1983 as Economist Tokyo Bureau Chief, staying until 1986. Then in 1988 I came back on sabbatical leave and wrote “The sun also sets: why Japan will not be number one”, which against my expectation when it was published in 1989 found big resonance in Japan. The stock market was plunging, and mine was the most immediately available explanation. Ever since, journalists have constantly asked me what the sun is doing now! It also meant that even when I became editor in chief of The Economist in 1993 I spent much more time focused on Japan than I had expected, visiting as often as I could to keep track of the post-bubble developments, and wrote a book that appeared only in Japanese translation called “Kanrio no Taizai”, or the bureaucrats’ deadly sins. But later, with Prime Minister Koizumi consolidating reforms, and the banking system at last getting cleared up, I sent myself back in 2005 to research and wrote a much more optimistic special supplement for The Economist which became a book, “The sun also rises”.

Throughout the 35 years since I first came to Japan, I have both been fascinated and struck by the fact that although this is in so many ways an inward-looking self-contained nation, foreign observers are listened to and even have a chance of having a positive impact.

One element that had featured consistently in my writings ever since the 1980s had been observations and expectations for a growing role for women in employment and power. This seemed logical given that, at least before the bubble burst, Japan was heading for a labour shortage, but also the Equal Employment Law of 1986 had led to more females being recruited by major organisations. Japan’s excellent education surely meant that the underused half (= women) of the adult population would soon be used more productively.

Of course, this has developed a lot more slowly than I expected or hoped, partly for cultural reasons but also because Japan has not in fact had a labour shortage, until now.

I wanted to meet you, Gerhard tonight because we both are fascinated by the role Japanese women have in making Japan such a fascinating country, and how the many really strong Japanese women could have key roles in bringing growth and dynamic change back to Japan.

  • Could Japanese women have bigger roles for the development of Japan?
  • What is holding women back in Japan?
  • Who are the role models?

I am making interviews with high-achieving Japanese women to try to find answers, and plan to compile them into a book later this year. What would you say, Gerhard? And anyway, how did you end up here?

Gerhard Fasol:

My path to Japan is quite different than yours, Bill. I came to Japan first in 1984 as Fellow of Trinity College Cambridge, and scientist at the Max-Planck-Institute in Stuttgart, part of a project to build a research cooperation with NTT’s R&D labs. I saw that Japan was very important in technology and weakly linked to the outside – and still is today, I think. So in 1984 I decided to make Japan my second professional focus in addition to physics and electronics. Like you – the deeper I get into Japan, the more I learn about Japan, the greater my fascination, and my motivation to contribute.

Now I am working on many different projects, working on international technology M&A projects, and I am also one of a microscopic number of foreigners on the Board of Directors of a stock market listed Japanese corporation – reforming Japanese corporate governance hands-on.

Could Japanese women have bigger roles for the development of Japan?

Gerhard Fasol:

I think that the equal participation of women in leadership is directly linked to the population issue, ie the number of children born.

According to the Inter-Parliamentary Union in 2016 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS

  • in Japan 10% of Members of Parliament were women,
  • while in Sweden 44% of Members of Parliament are women,
  • 37% in Germany and
  • 26% in France –
  • the world average is 23% women in Parliaments.

In Japan the ratio of women in Parliament has increased from 1% in 1990 to 10% in 2016, so there is progress. If we extrapolate, and if the trend continues, then it might take another 30 years or so until Japan reaches world average in terms of women bringing women’s views into Parliament, and taking part in making the laws. And it might take Japan 100 years to reach Scandinavian standards of women’s participation in making the laws of the land – unless there is some acceleration in Japan.

Japan’s most powerful Ministry, the Ministry of Finance, did not hire any women into career positions for a period of about 10 years!

At the 2015 New Year event of Kyoto Bank, Keidanren Chairman Mr Sadayuki Sakakibara showed that Japan’s spending on aged people is dramatically higher than spending on children, and that this ratio is increasing with time, Japan spends more and more on aged people and less and less on children. There are two ways to look at this situation:

  • one way is to say: we have an aging society, therefore its only natural to spend more on
    the aged, and less for children
  • the opposite way to look at the same situation is to say: we are spending less and less for children, no wonder we have fewer and fewer children. If we did more for young people, maybe people will have more children….

Actually most Japanese women I talk to want 2-3 children, but many cannot for financial reasons.

By nature, women give birth to children, not men, so more women in decision making positions including Government and Parliament will bring children’s issues into decision making.

As an example, child birth costs in Japan are not covered by health insurance, while they are everywhere in Europe. There are many other open and hidden costs of having children in Japan compared to Europe.

We discussed some of these issues at the recent Ludwig Boltzmann Forum on women’s development and leadership, which I organized here in Tokyo http://www.boltzmann.com/forum/2016-womens-leadership/

What is holding women back in Japan?

Gerhard Fasol:

The most important factor are mindsets. The key to give more power to women in Japan is to change mindsets, to change the way of thinking.

As an example, the Prefecture of Kanagawa in 2015 created the “woman act” committee, under the slogan “women, step by step, take more responsibility”, however this committee both in 2015 and also in 2016 consisted of 11 men – not one single woman leader: http://www.pref.kanagawa.jp/osirase/0050/womanact/
Why not create a committee of 11 women leaders to lead efforts on gender equality in Kanagawa Prefecture? Why not promote women to leadership positions in Kanagawa Prefecture?

Another factor holding women back are the very long working hours common in Japan. As an example, at a recent EU-Japan gender equality conference, the Danish polician Astrid Krag, who was Minister for Health and Prevention at the age of 29 – 32 years, and who has two children, explaned that in the Parliament of Denmark the decision was taken not to take any vote after 4pm, so that Members of Parliament can be back home by 5pm, collect children from daycare centers in time etc. So in the Parliament of Denmark it is guaranteed that Members of Parliament can leave at 4pm. In today’s Japan such action is unthinkable, age 29 – with young children – would be unbelievably young for a Government Minister in Japan. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Astrid_Krag

Late-night or overnight sessions at work, including Parliament, makes life incredibly difficult in Japan for parents with young children, doubtlessly contributing to the small number of women in top positions in Japan.

Who are the role models?

Gerhard Fasol:

Despite these difficulties, there is a substantial number of very strong women in Japan, who have worked their way up into leadership positions.

Examples are the Mayor of Yokohama, Ms Fumiko Hayashi, who succeeded in a very distinguished business career, and the Mayor of Tokyo, Ms Yuriko Koike, who won the election on her own as an independent candidate, because she did not receive the backing of her party.

Bill Emmott:

That is great, as I have now interviewed Koike-san and plan to interview Hayashi-san during my next visit. Personally, as well as admiring women who have made it to the top in the tough political world I also admire and am interested in women succeeding as entrepreneurs and as executives in entrepreneurial companies. By starting and building their own companies, women can really create new realities, showing that new organisational cultures are possible in a Japanese context. Do you agree?

Gerhard Fasol:

Japan has quite a number of women entrepreneurs and business leaders, Ms Tomoko Namba, Founder of Japan’s Internet company DeNA come to mind,
https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/南場智子
as well as Ms Fujiyo Ishiguro, Founder and CEO of the NetYear Group:
http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/people/person.asp?personId=867078&privcapId=717286

Science is also an interesting area. We have women leaders in Japanese medicine, I invited some for the Ludwig Boltzmann Forum on women’s development and leadership http://www.boltzmann.com/forum/2016-womens-leadership/

Kyushu University has one single full Professor of Medicine Professor Kiyoko Kato, she explains the situation of women in Japanese Obstetrics and Gynecology here http://www.boltzmann.com/forum/2016-womens-leadership/kiyoko-kato-obstetrics-gynecology/
while Professor Kyoko Nomura has built a center to support women medical doctors and women medical researchers at Teikyo University. She spoke about the situation facing women in medicine in Japan here: http://www.boltzmann.com/forum/2016-2/kyoko-nomura/

Towards the future

Gerhard Fasol:

The tantalizing issue is that the key is to change mindsets, and thats at the same time superficially easy, but at the same time incredibly hard. Thus outstanding strong Japanese women – and there are many of them – have a choice either to work their way up to the top in Japan, start their own company in Japan, or on the other hand to move to Europe, elsewhere in Asia, or to the USA – I know several strong Japanese women, including several Japanese medical doctors, who have moved to Europe or USA. They might of course come back to Japan at a later stage bringing global views and experiences to leadership positions in Japan in the future. I am very optimistic for the future of Japan – sometimes I wish things were moving faster.

Bill Emmott:

I agree entirely. I see Japanese women as both victims of the slow speed of change and as solutions to it. They really could make the Japan of 2030 look quite different, in all sorts of ways. It will be fascinating to watch.

Bill Emmott and Gerhard Fasol met at the restaurant MusMus in Tokyo

left to right: Gerhard Fasol, Ms Atsuko Konta (Manager of the restaurant MusMus), Bill Emmott
left to right: Gerhard Fasol, Ms Atsuko Konta (Manager of the restaurant MusMus), Bill Emmott

Copyright (c) 2017 by Bill Emmott and Gerhard Fasol. All Rights Reserved.

Categories
Economics

Economic growth for Japan in 2016?

Japan’s companies are key to Japan’s growth

by Gerhard Fasol

Economic growth: Almost everyone agrees that economic growth is preferred over stagnation and decline. Fiscal policy and printing money unfortunately can’t deliver growth.

  1. Building fresh new successful companies,
  2. returning stagnating or failed established companies back to growth (see: “Speed is like fresh food” by JVC-Kenwood Chairman Kawahara), and
  3. adjusting the structure and business models of existing companies to the rapidly changing and globalizing world (see: “Japanese management – why is it not global?” by Masamoto Yashiro)

deliver growth.

Economic growth for Japan: reducing friction

Governments best help economic growth by reducing friction, and by getting out of the way of entrepreneurs building, turning-round, and refocusing companies.

Some required action is counter to intuition: for example, in many cases reducing tax rates increases Government’s tax income, a fact known for many years. Effective education and research are key to create, understand and apply such non-obvious knowledge.

Economic growth for Japan: corporate leadership and governance reform

Companies need efficient leadership, leadership needs feedback, wise and diverse oversight by Boards of Directors, who ring alarm bells long before a company hits the rocks, or fades into irrelevance. Corporate governance reform may be the most important component of “Abenomics”. Read a Board Director’s view on Japan’s corporate governance reforms:

Japan’s electrical conglomerates are some of the poster children motivating Japan’s corporate governance reforms. In an interview about Toshiba’s future on BBC-TV a few days ago, I explained that Japan’s electrical conglomerates showed no growth and no profits for about 20 years, and the refocusing Toshiba has announced now should have been done much much earlier, 10-20 years ago (“Speed is like fresh food“). Refocusing Japan’s established corporate giants will release resources for start-ups, spin-outs and growth companies.

Economic growth for Japan: Japan can be very good at restructuring and turn-rounds

After Japan’s economic bubble burst in the 1990’s, Japan developed much know-how to successfully turn around failed companies:

Happy New Year!

Gerhard Fasol

Copyright·©2016 ·Eurotechnology Japan KK·All Rights Reserved·

Categories
Japan Market Entry Leadership M&A

Volkswagen Suzuki divorce – lessons for partnership strategies in Japan

“Mr Suzuki didn’t want to be a VW employee” (Prof. Dudenhoeffer via Bloomberg)

Partnerships in Japan without meeting of minds, trust, and communication don’t work

by Gerhard Fasol, All Rights Reserved. 18 September 2015

On 9 December 2009, Volkswagen-CEO Mr Martin Winterkorn and Suzuki-CEO Mr Osamu Suzuki at a press conference in Tokyo announced a “comprehensive partnership”.

A Reuters photograph shows a beaming and smiling Mr Winterkorn, while Mr Suzuki looks the other way, avoiding Mr Winterkorn’s eyes. Mr Winterkorn and Mr Suzuki don’t seem to have any language in common, therefore can’t talk to each other. Wall Street Journal writes that details of their “comprehensive partnership” will be negotiated later, in weeks or in months. Looking back it is obvious that these negotiations never were successful.

The Volkswagen-Suzuki partnership soon lead to publicly discussed disputes between both partners, culminating in Osamu Suzuki” blog post “Suzuki and Wagen now and the way forward” (スズキとワーゲンの今とこれから) which sealed the fate of the partnership in the most public way possible.

Professor Ferdinand Dudenhoeffer, Director of the Center for Automotive Research at the University Duisburg-Essen according to Bloomberg, summarized: “Mr Suzuki didn’t want to be a Volkswagen employee, and that’s understandable”.

Read a detailed account and analysis of the Suzuki-Volkswagen partnership, its divorce, and the financial details here.

Lessons to learn from the Suzuki Volkswagen divorce: communication & respect

  • “Comprehensive partnership” without meeting of minds does not work
  • Partnerships are hard when CEOs on both sides don’t have any language in common, thus can’t talk to each other
  • Hidden agendas destroy trust
  • Without trust partnerships don’t work
  • Processes and methods (e.g. acquisitions of minor players all over Europe) successful in Europe often don’t work in Japan
  • Partnerships without respect both ways don’t work
  • Renault and Carlos Ghosn (at least before the 2018/2019 scandals), and Daimler with Mitsubishi-Fuso-Trucks show us how to build an Japanese-European car company alliance, Daimler (with Mitsubishi Motors) and Volkswagen (with Suzuki) show us how it does not work

Read our analysis in detail here: Suzuki Volkswagen “Wagen-san” divorce: how not to partner & lessons to learn.

Copyright 2015 Eurotechnology Japan KK All Rights Reserved

Categories
Japan Market Entry M&A media

Hulu Japan operations sold to Nippon Television

Hulu ends direct operations in Japan

be Gerhard Fasol

Continues licensing relationship with Nippon Television Network Corporation

Hulu started Japan operations on August 31, 2011, and less than three years later, CEO Mike Hopkins announced in his blog the sale of Japan operations to Nippon Television Network Corporation (日本テレビ放送網株式会社).

During this time, Hulu Japan had grown to 50 content partnerships, offering 13,000 TV drama, movie and anime titles: about 1000 movies and 12,000 TV episodes.

In March 2015 Hulu Japan, now under Nippon TV ownership, achieved 1 million subscriptions.

Hulu-CEO, Mike Hopkins, did not announce why Hulu sold Japan operations to Nippon TV. We assume that Hulu, owned by traditional large media corporations (NBC, Fox and Disney) saw the need to partner with a large established Japanese media company to achieve wide penetration and long term growth. Maybe Hulu had expected much more rapid growth in subscription numbers in Japan?

Hulu-Japan = HJ Holdings, LLC (HJホールディングス合同会社)

Hulu’s services are controlled via internet location detection, and were initially blocked anywhere outside the USA.

On August 31, 2011, Hulu started operations in Japan with a monthly subscription charge of YEN 1480.

Hulu Japan was incorporated in September 2011.

On April 12, 2012, Hulu Japan reduced the monthly subscription charge to YEN 980.

On February 27th, 2014 Hulu-CEO, Mike Hopkins, announced the sale of Hulu Japan to Nippon Television Network Corporation (not the Nippon Television Holding company).

Thus the company operating Hulu services in Japan is HJ Holdings, LLC (HJホールディングス合同会社), and is owned 100% by Nippon Television Network Corporation (日本テレビ放送網株式会社), a subsidiary of Nippon Television Holdings, Inc. (日本テレビホールディングス株式会社).

On March 23, 2015, Hulu Japan achieved 1 million subscriptions.

Hulu – “Anywhere, Anytime”

Hulu was founded in 2007 to offer streaming video on demand (VOD) over the internet, and is a joint venture between:

  • NBCUniversal Television Group (Comcast) (32%)
  • Fox Broadcasting Company (21st Century Fox) (36%)
  • Disney–ABC Television Group (The Walt Disney Company) (32%)

The name Hulu comes from two Mandarin Chinese words, húlú (葫芦/葫蘆), “calabash; bottle gourd”, and hùlù (互录/互錄), “interactive recording” (source: Wikipedia.org)

Japan’s media market

Hulu is not the only company offering Video-on-Demand (VOD) services, and is facing considerable competition.

Amazon.com started Amazon Instant Video (Amazon・インスタント・ビデオ) in Japan in November 2013.

Read our report on Japan’s Media Landscape

(approx. 200 pages, pdf file)

Copyright (c) 2014-2015 Eurotechnology Japan KK All Rights Reserved

Categories
fashion Japan Market Entry M&A

Burberry solves its “Japan problem”, at least for now

Burberry goes direct in the world’s most important luxury market: why did Burberry not decide on less disruptive options?

Sanyo-Shokai pivots from Burberry to Mackintosh and continues the valuable Black Label and Blue Label lines

by Gerhard Fasol, All Rights Reserved. 18 August 2015

Burberry Japan – the start of a relationship: Sanyo Shokai started importing Burberry coats to Japan in 1965, and in 1970 partnered with trading company Mitsui to design, make and sell apparel, coats, suits and other fashion items under the Burberry brand under license from the London based Burberry company. According to trade sources, Mitsui licensed the Burberry brand from Burberry, and Mitsui then sub-licensed to Sanyo Shokai.

Burberry's new directly owned flagship store in Tokyo Omotesando
Burberry’s new directly owned flagship store in Tokyo Omotesando

Sanyo Shokai independently developed the Burberry brand business in Japan, creating many products under the Burberry brand in Japan which did not exist anywhere else in the world. In particular Sanyo Shokai created the Burberry Blue Label brand for young ladies and the Burberry Black Label for young men. These products were developed by Sanyo Shokai specially for the needs of Japanese customers, and marketed and sold under the Burberry brand locally in Japan, but were not officially exported to other countries. Of course, tourists coming to Japan could buy these Burberry-Japan products and take them home, and still today there is a secondary online market for these Japan-only Burberry products, including Blue Label and Black Label.

A brand-disconnect was created between Burberry-Japan and the rest of the world of Burberry, which by Burberry, and fashion world insiders was considered as the “Burberry Japan problem”. However, the “Japan problem” yielded excellent sales and profits for Sanyo Shokai, and excellent license/royalty fee payments from Sanyo Shokai to Burberry, which made it hard for Burberry to consider other options in Japan.

Starting with the appointment of Rose Marie Bravo in 1997, who hired creative director Roberto Menichetti, Burberry changed the brand strategy, aiming to transform Burberry from a premium apparel brand to a luxury brand. Burberry’s Japan business became a problem in this transformation, since Burberry’s Japan business was not Burberry’s business at all, but Sanyo Shokai’s, and therefore was independently run by Sanyo Shokai with its own Japan-only products and sub-brands Burberry Blue Label and Burberry Black Label.

Burberry decided to carry out the transformation from the indirect license model, to the direct business model in Japan. Burberry’s license to Sanyo Shokai was meant to expire in 2020, but Burberry brought the termination of the license contract forward to June 2015.

Burberry’s challenge is now to build a different luxury Burberry business in Japan under the same brand name, while Sanyo Shokai’s challenge is to manage the pivot from the Burberry brand to the Mackintosh London brand as smoothly as possible: to move as many customers directly over from the Burberry brand to the Mackintosh brand and other brands used by Sanyo Shokai. Sanyo Shokai has the advantage that Sanyo Shokai keep almost all the former Burberry store locations and refurbishes them over summer 2015 into Macintosh and other Sanyo Shokai stores.

Burberry had to give up the 300-500 Burberry branded stores in Japan which it had no direct control over, most of which Sanyo Shokai will now transform into Mackintosh London and Mackintosh Philosophy stores. In addition, Sanyo Shokai will develop two sub-brands following on from Burberry Blue Label and Burberry Black Label, now under the “Crestbridge” brand:

Sanyo Shokai has until June 2016 to sell its existing Burberry licensed products.

Why did Burberry and Sanyo-Shokai not decide on a less disruptive split? Read our analysis here.

Burberry goes direct in Japan

With the expiry of the license agreement with Sanyo Shokai and Mitsui Trading company, Burberry operates the Burberry business in Japan direct. There is an approx. 1 year transition period where Sanyo Shokai seems to be permitted to sell remaining stocks which are still left from the validity period of the license.

Burberry is now building business in Japan both via its new flagship store in Tokyo Omotesando, other direct stores and indirect stores, and Burberry is also building direct online business via the internet and mobile phones/smartphones.

Burberry's new directly owned flagship store in Tokyo Ginza
Burberry’s new directly owned flagship store in Tokyo Ginza
Burberry's new directly owned flagship store in Tokyo Ginza
Burberry’s new directly owned flagship store in Tokyo Ginza

Burberry Japan luxury non-apparel joint venture

While the apparel license was terminated in June 2015, on 18 November 2008, Burberry, Sanyo Shokai and Mitsui entered into a luxury non-apparel joint venture for Japan operational for the Spring/Summer season 2010.

Burberry (バーバリー)

Burberry was founded by Thomas Burberry, designer of the famous Burberry trench coat in 1856 in London.

Today Burberry Group plc is a public company, traded on the London Stock Exchange:

  • Annual revenues: UKL 2.523 billion (US$ 10.4 billion) (year to March 31, 2015)
  • Annual net income: UKL 341.1 million (US$ 531 million) (year to March 31, 2015)
  • Market Cap: UKL 6.67 billion (US$ 10.4 billion) (August 18, 2015)

Burberry Blue Label (バーバリーブルーレーベル) pivot to Crestbridge Blue Label

Burberry Blue Label was a sub-brand developed by Sanyo Shokai for women. Currently Burberry Blue Label products are traded online second-hand in Japan, and Sanyo Shokai is continuing the Blue Label Brand without the “Burberry” brand.

With the termination of the Burberry license, Sanyo Shokai pivoted this sub-brand to Blue Label Crestbridge.

Blue Label Crestbridge is:

  • Contemporary British
  • Progressive Preppy
  • Cute essence
  • Fine quality
  • Japan x British. British fashion born in Japan

Creative Director is: Yasuhiro Mihara (三原 康裕)

100s of former Burberry Blue Label stores are now converted to Blue Label Crestbridge stores
100s of former Burberry Blue Label stores are now converted to Blue Label Crestbridge stores
100s of former Burberry Blue Label stores are now converted to Blue Label Crestbridge stores
100s of former Burberry Blue Label stores are now converted to Blue Label Crestbridge stores

Burberry Black Label (バーバリーブラックレーベル) pivot to Black Label Crestbridge

Burberry Black Label was a sub-brand developed by Sanyo Shokai for men. Currently Burberry Black Label products are traded online second-hand in Japan, and Sanyo Shokai is continuing the Black Label Brand without the “Burberry” brand.

With the termination of the Burberry license, Sanyo Shokai pivoted this sub-brand to Black Label Crestbridge .

Black Label Crestbridge is:

  • Contemporary British
  • British trad
  • Clean
  • Catchy & humour
  • Fine quality
  • Japan x British. British Fashion born in Japan

Creative Director is: Yasuhiro Mihara (三原 康裕)

Black Label Crestbridge - Tokyo-Harajuku flagship store, one of three Black Label flagship stores in Tokyo
Black Label Crestbridge – Tokyo-Harajuku flagship store, one of three Black Label flagship stores in Tokyo
Black Label Crestbridge flagship store in Tokyo-Harajuku
Black Label Crestbridge flagship store in Tokyo-Harajuku

Mackintosh (マッキントッシュ): reinventing the Scottish rubber raincoat brand via Japan

The Mackintosh is a waterproof raincoat made of rubberized fabric invented by Charles Macintosh and first sold in 1824 (note that the inventor is named Macintosh, while his invention is today known as Mackintosh, with an added “k”).

The company was founded in Glasgow, Scotland around 1846. The company went through ups and downs, management buy-outs, and in the 1970s was mainly producing uniforms for British Rail and the London Metropolitan Police. British Rail and the Police procurement were looking for cheaper options, so Mackintosh had to reinvent its business leading to the reinvention of Mackintosh as a fashion brand.

In 2007 the Osaka firm Yagi Tsusho (八木通商株式会社) acquired the company and the brand Mackintosh, and created a new flagship store in Mount Street in London’s Mayfair.

The Mackintosh brand as a fashion label was created via Japan, as described by The Scotsman.

Sanyo Shokai reached a licensing and business development partnership with Yaki Tusho regarding the Mackintosh London brand.

Sanyo Shokai’s strategy is to replace the lost Burberry license by the Mackintosh London brand. Sanyo Shokai opened the first Mackintosh London store in Yokohama in July 2015, and plans to open 263 Mackintosh London stores in Japan.

Sanyo Shokai plans a price range of YEN 120,000 – 160,000 for coats and suits. Most Mackintosh London stores will be Sanyo Shokai stores, which were operating under the Burberry brand previously, continuing business at the same locations with the same staff, converting from the Burberry to the Mackintosh brand identity, including the luxury floors in the main Japanese department stores. Sanyo Shokai plans to have converted approx. 170 stores in summer 2015.

Sanyo Shokai is now developing two sub-brands:

Sanyo Shokai (株式会社三陽商会)

Sanyo Shokai (株式会社三陽商会) was founded on May 11, 1943, and after an IPO in July 1971 is traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, Code 8011. Sanyo Shokai employs about 1300 people.

  • Annual revenues: YEN 109 billion (US$ 0.9 billion) (year to Dec 31, 2014)
  • Annual net income: YEN 6.4 billion (US$ 51 million) (year to Dec 31, 2014)
  • Market Cap: YEN 54 billion (US$ 0.4 billion) (August 18, 2015)
Sanyo Shokai Ginza Building (second Building from the left) in Tokyo Ginza, one of the world's top ranked shopping areas, being converted from Burberry to Sanyo branding.
Sanyo Shokai Ginza Building (second Building from the left) in Tokyo Ginza, one of the world’s top ranked shopping areas, being converted from Burberry to Sanyo branding.
Sanyo Shokai Ginza Building in Tokyo-Ginza, one of the world's prime luxury shopping areas (was Burberry, now converted back to Sanyo branding)
Sanyo Shokai Ginza Building in Tokyo-Ginza, one of the world’s prime luxury shopping areas (was Burberry, now converted back to Sanyo branding)
Sanyo Shokai's "Sanyo Ginza Tower" after conversion from Burberry branding to Black Label by Crestbridge, Blue Label by Crestbridge, and other Sanyo brands
Sanyo Shokai’s “Sanyo Ginza Tower” after conversion from Burberry branding to Black Label by Crestbridge, Blue Label by Crestbridge, and other Sanyo brands
Sanyo Shokai's "Sanyo Ginza Tower" after conversation from Burberry branding to Black Label by Crestbridge, Blue Label by Crestbridge, and other Sanyo brands
Sanyo Shokai’s “Sanyo Ginza Tower” after conversation from Burberry branding to Black Label by Crestbridge, Blue Label by Crestbridge, and other Sanyo brands
Sanyo Shokai's "Sanyo Ginza Tower" after conversion from Burberry branding to Black Label by Crestbridge, Blue Label by Crestbridge, and other Sanyo brands
Sanyo Shokai’s “Sanyo Ginza Tower” after conversion from Burberry branding to Black Label by Crestbridge, Blue Label by Crestbridge, and other Sanyo brands

Yagi Tsusho (八木通商株式会社)

Yagi Tsusho (八木通商株式会社) was founded on December 21, 1946 and is a trading, marketing and merchandizing company based in Osaka.

In 2007 Yagi Tsusho acquired the Scottish company Mackintosh.

Yagi Tsusho employs about 200 people.

  • Annual revenues: Annual revenues: YEN 38.8 billion (US$ 312 million) (year to March 31, 2015)

Why did Burberry and Sanyo-Shokai not decide on a less disruptive split? Read our analysis here.

We guide companies to overcome the complexities of Japan’s markets – contact us:

Japan’s Media Landscape – analysis

(approx. 200 pages, pdf file)

Copyright (c) 2015-2019 Eurotechnology Japan KK All Rights Reserved

Categories
games Japan Market Entry mobile

Google Play apps Japan: which android apps show highest revenues?

Top grossing apps (Feb. 18, 2015)

Google play apps Japan ranking in Japan by gross revenues

AppAnnie showed that in terms of combined iOS AppStore + Google play apps Japan revenues, Japan is No. 1 globally, spending more than the USA. Therefore Japan is naturally the No. 1 target globally for many mobile game companies!

Android Google Play – Japan “Top Grossing” apps ranking of February 18, 2015:

Note that the Android/Google Play ranking shown here is very similar to the iOS top grossing ranking.

  • No. 1 Puzzle & Dragons by GungHo
  • No. 2 Monster strike (by Mixi)
  • No. 3 白猫プロジェクト (= white cat project) (by Colopl Inc.)
  • No. 4 クイズRPG 魔法使いと黒猫のウィズ (= Quiz RPG (role playing game) The World of Mystic Wiz, the which and the black cat wiz) (by Colopl Inc.)
  • No. 5 LINE Disney tsumu tsumu (by LINE Corporation) (ツムツム = Tsum Tsum)
  • No. 6 LINE PokoPoko (by LINE Corporation)
  • No. 7 Dragon Quest Monsters Superlight (by Square Enix)
  • No. 8 LINE (by LINE Corporation)
  • No. 9 Final Fantasy Record Keeper (by DeNA Ltd)
  • No. 10 LINE Rangers (by LINE Corporation)
  • No. 11 Love life! School Idol Festival (by KLab Inc.)
  • No. 12 Logres of Swords and Sorcery – popular online RPG (by Marvelous Inc.)
  • No. 13 Runaway lives motorcycle Tiger (by Donuts Co Ltd)
  • No. 14 Clash of Clans (by Supercell)
  • No. 15 Chain chronicle – real scenario RPG (ChainChro = チェンクロ) (by SEGA Corporation)
  • No. 16 Actual powerful pro-baseball (実況パワフルプロ野球) (by KONAMI)
  • No. 17 Schoolgirl strikers (by Square Enix)
  • No. 18 Puyo puyo!! Quest (by Sega Corporation)
  • No. 19 LINE POP2 (by LINE Corporation)
  • No. 20 Granblue Fantasy (by Cygames Inc)
  • No. 21 Drift Spirits (by Bandai Namco Games Inc)
  • No. 22 Pro baseball Pride 2014 (by Colopl Inc.)
  • No. 23 Sengoku Enbu – KIZNA – (by Sumzap Inc)
  • No. 24 Dragon poker (by Asobism Co Ltd)
  • No. 25 Gandam Conquest (by Bandai Namco Games Inc)

Japan’s iconic game companies created many game categories – this tradition carries over to mobile gaming now.

Copyright 2015 Eurotechnology Japan KK All Rights Reserved

Categories
games mobile

Japan apps: which are the top grossing apps in Japan’s iPhone app store?

Top grossing app ranking (Feb. 10, 2015)

by Gerhard Fasol

AppAnnie showed that in terms of combined iOS AppStore + Google Play revenues, Japan is No. 1 globally, spending more than the USA. Therefore Japan is naturally the No. 1 target globally for many mobile game companies, and quite a few of the top grossing apps in Japan are of foreign origin – can you guess which?!

iOS AppStore-Japan “Top Grossing” ranking of February 10, 2015:

Note that the iOS ranking shown here is very similar to the Android / Google Play top grossing ranking.

  • No. 1 Monster strike (by Mixi) from rank 2 on July 13, 2014
  • No. 2 Puzzle & Dragons by GungHo (from rank 1 on July 13, 2014)
  • No. 3 白猫プロジェクト (= white cat project) (by Colopl Inc.)
  • No. 4 Dragon Quest Monsters Superlight (by Square Enix) (from Rank 12 on July 13, 2014)
  • No. 5 LINE Disney tsumu tsumu (by LINE Corporation) (ツムツム = Tsum Tsum) (from Rank 3 on July 13, 2014)
  • No. 6 Final Fantasy Record Keeper (by DeNA Ltd)
  • No. 7 LINE (by LINE Corporation)
  • No. 8 Love life! School Idol Festival (by KLab Inc.) (was rank 9 on July 13, 2014)
  • No. 9 LINE PokoPoko (by LINE Corporation)
  • No. 10 Logres of Swords and Sorcery – popular online RPG (by Marvelous Inc.) (was rank 14 on July 13, 2014)
  • No. 11 Clash of Clans (by Supercell) (was rank 5 on July 13, 2014)
  • No. 12 Runaway lives motorcycle Tiger (by Donuts Co Ltd)
  • No. 13 Drift Spirits (by Bandai Namco Games Inc)
  • No. 14 Actual powerful pro-baseball (実況パワフルプロ野球) (by KONAMI)
  • No. 15 Sengoku Enbu – KIZNA – (by Sumzap Inc) (was rank 8 on July 13, 2014)
  • No. 16 Sword Art Online Code Resister (by Bandai Namco Games Inc)
  • No. 17 Chain chronicle – real scenario RPG (ChainChro = チェンクロ) (by SEGA Corporation)
  • No. 18 Schoolgirl strikers (by Square Enix)
  • No. 19 Summons Board (by GungHo Online Entertainment)
  • No. 20 Puyo puyo!! Quest (by Sega Corporation) (was rank 11 on July 13, 2014)
  • No. 21 Granblue Fantasy (by Cygames Inc)
  • No. 22 LINE Manga – daily reload of popular manga free of charge (by LINE Corporation)
  • No. 23 Brave frontier (by Alim Co Ltd) (was rank 4 on July 13, 2014)
  • No. 24 Dragon poker (by Asobism Co Ltd) (was rank 6 on July 13, 2014)
  • No. 25 LINE POP2 (by LINE Corporation)

Japan’s iconic game companies created many game categories – this tradition carries over to mobile gaming now.

Copyright 2015 Eurotechnology Japan KK All Rights Reserved

Categories
Economics Leadership

Japanese management – why is it not global? What should we do? asks Masamoto Yashiro

Masamoto Yashiro: Japan leader and Chairman emeritus of Esso, Exxon, Citibank, Shinsei Bank

Masamoto Yashiro at brainstorming by President of Tokyo University

Masamoto Yashiro’s talk notes by Gerhard Fasol

Masamoto Yashiro is a legend in Japan’s banking and energy industry. He built Shinsei Bank from the ashes of the bankrupt Long Term Credit Bank of Japan, and served in leadership positions (Chairman, CEO, Board Member) in Esso, Exxon, Citibank, Shinsei Bank, and the China Construction Bank.

Tonight a small group of about 60 people were invited to join Masamoto Yashiro and the President of The University of Tokyo, Professor Junichi Hamada, for an evening workshop and brainstorming event about globalization of Japanese corporations at The University of Tokyo. Participating were a selected group of The University of Tokyo graduates, faculty, and selected alumni from several elite Universities associated with The University of Tokyo, and currently working at major Japanese trading companies, Ministry of Finance, financial firms, global consulting firms and other global firms.

After The University of Tokyo President Junichi Hamada’s introductory words, we heard Masamoto Yashiro’s fantastic overview of how he thinks Japanese companies need to change and why, followed by Q&A, then by a brainstorming session in the format of changing groups of four on about 15 separate tables between the participants, and then followed by buffet and drinks reception.

Topic of the evening was the globalization issues of Japanese corporations, also discussed in our work about Japan’s Galapagos issues:

About Masamoto Yashiro (八城政基)

Wikipedia pages:

Masamoto Yashiro graduated from Kyoto University (Law Faculty) in 1954 and The University of Tokyo Graduate School in 1958, and entered Standard Vacuum Oil Company. In 1964 he became Director of Esso, and later Special Assistant to the Chairman of Standard Oil New Jersey, and in 1986 President of Esso Sekyu KK.
In 1989, Masamoto Yashiro moved to become Japan representative of Citibank NA, and Chairman of Citicorp Japan in 1997.
IN 1999, Masamoto Yashiro became CEO of New LTCB Partners CV, the company emerging from the bankruptcy proceedings of the Long Term Credit Bank of Japan, and was in charge of the revival of LTCB as Chairman and CEO, with investment from Ripplewood Investment Fund, creating today’s Shinsei Bank.
He resigned as CEO of Shinsei Bank in 2005, but returned as Chairman and CEO in 2008, from which he retired in 2010.
In 2004, he was appointed Director of the China Construction Bank.

Masamoto Yashiro
Masamoto Yashiro (former Chairman of Shinsei Bank, Chairman of Citicorp Japan and President of Esso Japan, Director of China Construction Bank)

Japanese management – why is it not global? What should we do? asks Masamoto Yashiro

Note: this record was reviewed personally by Masamoto Yashiro, who made some corrections.

Japanese management – why is it not global? Outline:

  • Some people may argue that Japanese companies need not be global. Why?
  • We must accept that English is an essential tool for international communication.
  • Some impediments that Japanese companies face:
    1. The traditional approach is not effective in developing future leaders.
    2. The Japanese-style board structure is not appropriate to ensure sound corporate governance.
    3. Management structure needs to be changed to suit a global business.
    4. The current limited role of foreign nationals in the management and board structure
  • What should be the most important corporate objective?
  • Concluding remarks
Masamoto Yashiro (right hand side) presenting and President of Tokyo University Junichi Hamada (sitting on the left) listening
Masamoto Yashiro (standing at the podium on the right hand side) presenting and President of Tokyo University Junichi Hamada (sitting on the left) listening

Summary of Masamoto Yashiro’s talk:

Some people may argue that Japanese companies need not be global. Why?

Some superficial discussions about “Japanese companies” contrast “permanent employment” and excellent pensions in Japanese companies with job-hopping and bad pensions in other countries, however, Masamoto Yashiro points out that during his time at Esso and later Exxon, most employees stayed 20-30 years at Exxon, and received excellent pensions, so “permanent longterm employment” or pension system has nothing to do with globalization, and Japanese leading companies are no different than leading companies in other countries in these respects. We have to search elsewhere for the causes of current problems most Japanese companies are facing.

Around 1990, about 20 years ago, Japan was extremely self-satisfied by the successful reconstruction after the war and economic growth and success, and Japan felt that Japan does not have anything to learn from others. This time is now over, Japan is in stagnation, and many Japanese companies are not globally competitive, and Japan and Japanese companies must change to become competitive again.

We must accept that English is an essential tool for international communication.

Masamoto Yashiro is convinced that Japanese companies must globalize, and must make English a business tool. He feels it is a great disadvantage that Japanese political and corporate leaders, when participating in international conference, such as Davos, mostly need to use interpreters, and this reduces their global impact and exchange of ideas dramatically.

Some impediments that Japanese companies face:

1. The traditional approach is not effective in developing future leaders.

The traditional approach in Japan is to rotate career employees every two years between totally different functions, in order to “develop well-rounded managers”. The result of this process are non-experts, which are not expert in anything.

As an example, during his leadership at Shinsei Bank, Masamoto Yashiro once requested a meeting with the IT Department leadership. To his great surprise 60 people turned up for the meeting (he had expected 2 or 3). He asked the Department Chief for particular information, and he could not understand the question and could not answer, same result one management lower. Only at the third layer from the top, Masamoto Yashiro could get his question answered – the top two management layers could not answer his questions about the work of the IT Department.
Quite generally there often far too many people at meetings at Japanese companies.

When at Exxon in the US as a relatively junior manager, Masamoto Yashiro, was asked about his opinion regarding the termination of a particular joint-venture relationship with a mid-size petroleum refining company in Japan known then as ゼネラル石油精製 who had financial trouble. Exxon had a 50% interest in this company and its relations goes back to very late 1950’s. In late 1985 at the Exxon Management Committee meeting in New York, all other managers favored to terminate the relationship with this joint venture partner in trouble in order to limit financial exposure, while Masamoto Yashiro argued that it was better to support the troubled partner and assist him with Exxon staff and expertise to return to profitability. To his great surprise the Chairman and his superiors at Exxon sided with his recommendation and changed their previous position following his advice. Generally he felt that in the USA his opinion as a Japanese manager was highly valued, because it provided a different view point.

In his experience in Japan the situation is totally opposite: Japanese senior management generally does not listen to junior employees, and particularly not to foreign nationals in the rare cases that there are any in Japanese companies. In fact, the most frequent question senior management at Japanese banks ask, is not for original ideas or creativity from junior staff, but instead: “What do other banks do?”

This deplorable Japanese situation even contrasts strongly with the situation in China, where Masamoto Yashiro was a Director of the China Construction Bank: in China leaders moved from Government agencies and Ministries to Banks, and to private industries and back.

Generally Masamoto Yashiro expressed the view, that the development of leaders is totally inadequate in Japan, and is better in China than in Japan.

In addition to the inadequate development of leaders in Japanese companies, the number of foreign nationals in management, Board and other leadership positions in Japanese companies is minute, there are no programs to attract and develop foreign nationals in leadership positions. On the contrary, when Shinsei Bank showed losses in the aftermath of the Lehman shock, Japan’s Financial Services Agencies ordered that Shinsei Bank must pay all foreign nationals on exactly the same pay levels as Japanese employees. Since foreign nationals typically have much higher schooling and other costs in Japan than Japanese staff, essentially all non-Japanese staff at Shinsei Bank left soon after.

Leaders can make a real difference.

How leaders are selected is of utmost importance.

At Exxon, senior management devote specially reserved time to identify suitable candidates for future leadership positions, “who can potentially be our CEO in the future”. The selected candidates are given special attention and special opportunities to train and develop their leadership abilities. Masamoto Yashiro has never heard about such special leadership development programs at Japanese companies.

2. The Japanese-style board structure is not appropriate to ensure sound corporate governance.

In Japan, Board Members are almost always managing employees of the company, so the question arises who’s interests they represent on the Board. Do they represent the interests of the institution (the company), the employees or the interests of the shareholders.

In Japan often the CEO of the company after his retirement remains as a Chairman for several years, keeps his office, secretary and company car, and creates large other expenses. Why? Probably because Japanese CEO pay is too low, so that the CEO does not wish to retire gracefully.

This is totally different in Western companies where retired CEOs leave the company and have no further role in the company in most cases. Masamoto Yashiro mentioned the retired Chairman of Exxon, who after his retirement naturally travelled by taxi. In Japanese it would be unthinkable according to Masamoto Yashiro that the retired Chairman of a major corporation would travel by ordinary taxi cab like ordinary people (Masamoto Yashiro did not mention subway or bus, or driving his own personal car….)

3. Management structure needs to be changed to suit a global business.

In non-Japanese companies in almost all cases have a thorough performance evaluation system. When performance is evaluated, the resulting distribution must be similar to a normal distribution, i.e. with considerable part of employees at the high end and substantial numbers at the low end of the performance curve. If this is not done, top performers cannot be sufficiently rewarded and will leave the company, while low performers would hold the whole company back.

In most Japanese companies on the other hand, if a thorough performance evaluation is done at all, in most cases a huge proportion of employees are just evaluated as average, satisfying performance, without clear distinctions between top and bottom performance.

Promotion and salary on the other hand in traditional Japanese companies is purely according to age, which leads to many problems, and causes under-performance of the whole company.

These problems are increased by the fact, that Japanese companies typically do not give the same evaluation or opportunities to non-Japanese nationals.

4. The current limited role of foreign nationals in management and board structure.

Even in the rare cases where foreign nationals are employed by Japanese companies in management or leadership positions e.g. in foreign subsidiaries, often junior Japanese employees which much lower rank and local knowledge do not respect and bypass non-Japanese management, and there is typically no fair evaluation system, evaluating Japanese and non-Japanese management according to the same standards of performance.

The change of this mindset (to keep non-Japanese out of management or leadership positions at Japanese corporations) is extremely important.

The change of mindset (to keep non-Japanese out of management or leadership positions at Japanese corporations) is not difficult at all and can be done quickly.

What should be the most important corporate objective?

When considering corporate governance it is important to develop a view on the objectives. When discussing the interest of shareholders, it is important to ask “which shareholders”? The interests of large shareholders who may own 10% or 20% of the corporation, or the interests of individual smaller shareholders? Other stake holders’ interests also need to be taken into account.

In general, Masamoto Yashiro expressed the view that both the institution’s (the company’s) and the shareholders interest are best served by stable long-term growth of the company. He mentioned as an example Exxon which showed triple-A rating and annual rate of growth of 15%-17% for over 100 years.

Concluding remarks.

Around 1990 Japan was self-satisfied with the economic success, and Japanese people thought that they have nothing to learn from anybody. This time is over now, and Japan and Japanese corporations much change to regain growth and to become competitive again.

Professor Junichi Hamada, President of The University of Tokyo, listening to Masamoto Yashiro's talk
Professor Junichi Hamada, President of The University of Tokyo, listening to Masamoto Yashiro’s talk

Japanese management – Q&A with Masamoto Yashiro (selected questions)

Q. You want Japanese companies to change. What are the good things you want Japanese companies to keep?

A. Loyalty. Consideration to stakeholders.

Q. Your work at Shinsei.

A. Communication was most important. When Masamoto Yashiro took over at Shinsei, the Bank has just gone through bankruptcy proceedings, so the moral was extremely low. Masamoto Yashiro had to reestablish optimism and moral. To do so, communication is most important. Masamoto Yashiro held weekly telephone conferences and every employee who wanted to could participate: from top management to cleaning staff/janitors. Everyone could come forward with his concerns.

Another fact was that there were so many traditions which made no sense. For example, female employees with University degrees would wear their own clothes, while female employees without University degrees would need to wear company uniform. There was an issue that lower paid staff had difficulty to afford appropriate clothing for bank work – so Masamoto Yashiro decided to award a clothing allowance to employees so that they could afford appropriate clothing.

Q. Many Japanese companies cannot hire young employees, because they cannot fire/discharge non-performing older employees.

A. Firing/discharge of non-performing employees can be done by paying adequate severance compensation. Considering that a non-performing employee who remains on the payroll for several years in addition to salary also creates a lot of secondary costs, it is typically cheaper to pay an appropriate severance package, and most people are happy to leave with an appropriate severance package, and often move to a more suitable position at a different company – this helps everyone. Of course some companies want to save money at all cost, and fire employees without adequate package and that can lead to problems.

Q. Having worked much of your career at global oil or energy companies, what to you think about Japanese oil companies?

A. Japanese oil companies are not really oil companies, because they do not invest enough upstream.

Q. Leadership?

A. Japanese companies must change. The mindset must change.

Q. University of Tokyo?

A. University of Tokyo at the moment I think is ranked on 30th or 40th position globally in most rankings, maybe top in Japan or in Asia, but that does not count, we need to look at the whole world, not just Japan or Asia. I think University of Tokyo should make the changes necessary be at least in the top ten globally. To get into the top ten globally, University of Tokyo needs to hire outstanding Professors where the best students from the whole world want to come and study. To get the best Researchers and Professors University of Tokyo has to pay what is necessary. Does not matter which language, English or Japanese or any other language. No outstanding student from other parts of the world wants to study Japanese first before studying at University of Tokyo. University of Tokyo should make the necessary changes so that the best students from top Universities globally also want to come to University of Tokyo.

Mr Masamoto Yashiro’s talk and Q&A were followed by a brainstorming session in groups among all participants of four about globalization, and global leadership development.

Read more about Masamoto Yashiro

Copyright 2013-2015 Eurotechnology Japan KK All Rights Reserved

Categories
energy Japan Market Entry Leadership

Sir Stephen Gomersall on UK-Japan business and globalization

Sir Stephen Gomersall: former British Ambassador to Japan and Chairman of Hitachi Europe

Sir Stephen Gomersall on UK-Japan business and globalization: Globalization and the art of tea

Hitachi – Japan’s most iconic corporation – under the leadership of Chairman & CEO, Hiroaki Nakanishi embarked on the “Smart Transformation Project” to globalize, to face a world where value creation has moved from manufacturing to innovation and solving customer’s problems, and to overcome long years of stagnation and low profits or losses, despite strong technology capabilities.

One of the most important brains behind Hitachi’s reinvention and globalization is Sir Stephen Gomersall. After a long and successful career as diplomat in the British Foreign Service, culminating in the years as British Ambassador to Japan 1999-2004, Sir Stephen joined Hitachi in 2004 as the first foreigner responsible for proposing and implementing Hitachi’s overseas regional strategy. Later Sir Stephen became responsible for all of Hitachi’s business in Europe as Chairman and Chief Executive of Hitachi Europe, and in addition Sir Stephen also served as Director on the Board of all Hitachi 2011-2014 overseeing all of Hitachi Group’s business as Board Director. With Sir Stephen’s leadership Hitachi achieved major business breakthroughs in Europe.

On March 5, 2015, Sir Stephen gave the “Princess Chichibu Memorial Lecture to the Japan British Society at Ueno Gakuen University in Tokyo with deep insights on Japan-British relations, on comparison of Britain’s and Japan’s position in the world, and on the challenges of globalization facing Japan and Japanese corporations – in particular Hitachi.

Sir Stephen is very clear that there is no alternative to globalization: “Globalisation poses tough challenges for Japanese companies, but is the only way forward”.

Read Sir Stephen’s lecture here:

Sir Stephen Gomersall: “Globalisation and the art of tea” (click the link above to read the full text of Sir Stephen’s Princess Chichibu Memorial Lecture)

Sir Stephen Gomersall

Stephen Gomersall was British Ambassador to Japan from 1999-2004, and Hitachi’s Chief Executive for Europe and subsequently Board Director from 2004-2014. He is now Adviser to the CEO, Hitachi Ltd.

Copyright (c) 2015 Eurotechnology Japan KK All Rights Reserved

Categories
Japan Market Entry M&A telecommunications

Fidelity Japan market entry into Japan’s cloud and data center markets via KVH

Fidelity: Japan market entry the patient and careful way

Fidelity’s Colt to acquire KVH for YEN 18.595 billion (€ 130.3 million = US$ 160 million)

Both Colt and KVH were founded with investments by Fidelity Investments and associated companies, Colt in London in 1992, and KVH in 1999 in Tokyo, as telecommunications service providers for the financial industry and other industrial customers. While KVH remained 100% owned by Fidelity and associated companies, Colt was listed on the London Stock Exchange in 1996.

Initially founded as telecommunications companies, both Colt and KVH have developed into “information delivery platforms” based on networking infrastructure, data centers, optical fibre networks and associated management and information services.

On November 12, 2014, Colt announced the plan to acquire KVH for YEN 18.595 billion (€ 130.3 million = US$ 160 million) in cash from KVH’s owner Fidelity Investments.

Since KVH is 100% owned by Fidelity Investments, and Colt have also been founded by Fidelity which is still a shareholder, the acquisition needs to be approved by independent Directors and by independent shareholders of Colt.

A General Meeting of Colt’s shareholder has been announced for December 16, 2014 at 10:00am in Luxembourg where the approval of shareholders of Colt will be sought.

Colt – the “information delivery platform”

Colt was founded by James P Hynes (Jim Hynes) with investments from Fidelity Investments and related companies in 1992 in London, and went public with an IPO on London Stock Exchange in 1996.

Colt operates 20 data centers and substantial optical fiber networks, and has more than 5000 employees.

Colt’s annual revenues are € 1,575.8 million (= US$ 2 billion) in 2013.

Colt market capitalization currently is UKL 1.19 billion (= US$ 1.9 billion).

KVH – “Asia’s information delivery platform”

KVH was founded by Fidelity Investments and related companies on April 2, 1999 in Tokyo.

KVH operates 9 Data Centers, owns optical fiber networks in Japan and to major financial centers in the world, and has about 590 employees.

KVH annual revenues are approx. € 133.6 million (= US$ 170 million) in FY2013, i.e. Colt is about 10 times bigger in terms of market cap and sales than KVH.

KVH owns optical fibre, ethernet, data center data infrastructure in Tokyo, Osaka and other parts of Asia.
KVH owns optical fibre, ethernet, data center data infrastructure in Tokyo, Osaka and other parts of Asia. This photograph shows KVH owned cable infrastructure in the center of Tokyo

The planned acquisition values KVH at YEN 18.595 billion (€ 130.3 million = US$ 160 million), i.e. COLT is about 12 times bigger than KVH in terms of market capitalization/value.

Implications of acquisition of KVH by Colt – view as a Japan (and Asia) market entry by Colt

From the point of view of Colt, the acquisition of KVH – which has always been a sister company via the common investor Fidelity Investments, and common founder Jim Hynes – is a relatively low risk market entry into Japan and several other major Asian markets, and promises to have a very high chance of success for all parties.

We need to keep in mind, that essentially all other large scale market entries into Japan by infrastructure based telecommunication operators have failed: Vodafone, Cable & Wireless, WorldCom’s market entries into Japan’s telecom markets have all failed, and to our knowledge KVH is the only remaining internationally owned telecom infrastructure company in Japan today.

You can read a detailed discussion about why Vodafone failed in Japan in our blog here “Vodafone Japan could have been a business worth US$ 50 billion today. Why did Vodafone Japan fail and sell to SoftBank?”.

Essentially, both Vodafone and Cable & Wireless failed in Japan’s telecom markets, because they did not have the multitude of skills and know-how needed to manage a telecommunications business in Japan in a competitive manner. Colt with the acquisition of KVH acquires this know-how, and KVH at the same time has been an internationally managed company from the outset, so that Colt avoids the risks of acquiring a 100% Japanese companies such as Vodafone had done by acquiring Japan Telecom, with all the cultural issues that this entails.

At the same time, we also need to keep the scale in mind. While KVH has a market capitalization (i.e. the purchase price) of US$ 160 million, it can be argued that Vodafone-Japan could be expected to have a capitalization of around US$ 60 billion today had it been successful – i.e. about 375 times larger than KVH.

Japan’s largest telecommunication operator NTT currently has a market capitalization of US$ 62 billion, i.e. about 390 times larger than KVH, while SoftBank’s market capitalization is about 500 times larger than KVH’s.

Thus, if we see Colt’s acquisition of KVH as a market entry into Japan by a European telecom operator, then this is on an approx. 300-400 times smaller scale than Vodafone’s failed market entry into Japan, and with far better circumstances, and a far higher chance of success, and in our view with very carefully controlled risks.

Without doubt, a merger of KVH with Colt was on the minds of Fidelity Investments and Jim Hynes, when they founded both KVH and Colt in the 1990s.

Copyright 2014 Eurotechnology Japan KK All Rights Reserved

Categories
Japan Market Entry M&A mobile

Vodafone Japan could have been a business worth US$ 50 billion today! Why did Vodafone Japan fail and sell to SoftBank?

What can we learn from Vodafone’s failure in Japan?

by Gerhard Fasol

Had Vodafone been successful in Japan, Vodafone’s Japan business could be worth € 40 billion (US$ 50 billion) today

In a separate blog post “EU-Japan Management: What is the value of good management?” we analyze what the value of Vodafone’s Japan business might be today, had Vodafone succeeded in Japan, based on current market values of the comparable companies NTT-Docomo, KDDI and Softbank, and we conclude that it is not unreasonable to assume that Vodafone’s Japan business could be worth € 40 billion (US$ 50 billion) today, had it been successful.

Vodafone Japan? Why did it fail and sell to SoftBank? – Quick answer

Vodafone Japan failed not for one single reason but for hundreds of reasons, which can be grouped into soft factors (mainly lack of understanding Japan and Japan’s telecom markets and it’s true size) and hard factors (mainly far too low investment) – read more details in our SoftBank-report:

  1. Soft factors:
    • Japan knowledge at HQ, and knowledge at HQ about the specifics of Japan’s telecom sector (or lack thereof).
    • choice of management structure (there were attempts to correct the management structure, however too little and too late).
    • attitude displayed both privately e.g. within the Japanese industry sector and publicly via marketing messages and advertising
    • choice of executives and lower ranking managers and their knowledge and experience in Japan’s telecom sector (or lack thereof)
    • lack of sufficient know-how and experience to manage a large Japanese company, and particular the chain of retail stores
    • lack of management and execution know-how in Japan: tried three (3!!) times to introduce / roll-out 3G services in Japan, and failed every time to attract sufficient subscribers. As a result Vodafone Japan was far behind in 3G introduction. Only after sale to SoftBank, did SoftBank succeed in implementing the transition to 3G
    • too high expectations for profitability and margins from HQ, which were out of line with profitability and returns usual in Japan, and out of line of competitor’s margins
    • and many more
  2. Hard factors:
    • far too low budgets for infrastructure investment resulting in much lower coverage and network quality compared to competitors NTT-DoCoMo and KDDI/au and TuKa, Willcom and others. As a consequence of far too low investment budgets, Vodafone failed three times to introduce 3G services in Japan. (3G services were not successfully introduced until after the acquisition by Softbank, and after conversion of Vodafone KK to Softbank-Mobile).
    • mobile phone handsets were inferior to the handsets offered by competitors NTT-DoCoMo and KDDI, and TuKa
    • and many more

Vodafone Japan? Why did it fail and sell to SoftBank? – Detailed answer

Find a long answer in this blog post below, in our other blog posts, and in some detail including statistics and financial data in our Softbank Report.

On Friday March 17, 2006, Vodafone and Softbank announced that Vodafone sells Vodafone KK (the totality of all Vodafone operations in Japan) to Softbank.

It has been reported that on Monday March 20, 2006, Softbank started to move all Vodafone KK staff, furniture and equipment from Vodafone KK’s former headquarters in the top floors of the Atago-Greenhills-Mori-Tower to Softbank headquarters in Shiodome (near Shinbashi). Also Softbank arranged very quickly that essentially all foreign expatriate managers left Vodafone KK – some stayed in Japan working for other IT companies, some returned to European Vodafone divisions, and some pursued telecom careers in USA, India, Bangladesh, or elsewhere.

By total coincidence, I had dinner with a high-level manager of Vodafone KK, of European nationality, at the indian restaurant Moti’s in Tokyo-Roppongi on exactly the same day, the Friday March 17, 2006 a few hours after the sale of Vodafone KK to Softbank was announced.
I asked him: “Which of the following is true:”

  1. Vodafone never did any market research in Japan?
  2. Vodafone did market research in Japan, but the quality was low?
  3. Vodafone did market research in Japan, but nobody read it?

This Vodafone KK (Vodafone Japan) manager’s answer at the indian dinner was (3): market research was done about Japan’s mobile phone market, but the market research was not sufficiently taken into account in the business and strategy planning.

Fact is, that Vodafone KK (Vodafone Japan) took many major strategy and market decisions in Japan, which were not related to the realities of Japan’s market. Here one example. When “rebranding” (=changing the company / product / services names) from J-Phone to Vodafone, this “rebranding” campaign was centered on global roaming, i.e. Vodafone enabled Japanese customers to use Japanese J-Phone/Vodafone mobile phones in a very large number of countries outside Japan as well as inside Japan. This was at a time, when Japan’s mainstream mobile 2G phone system which both DoCoMo and J-Phone used was PDC, while much of the rest of the world, especially Europe used GSM. However, what Vodafone overlooked was, that at that time DoCoMo had about 30,000 roaming customers, out of approx. 50 million subscribers, i.e. only about 0.1% of Japanese mobile phone users used international roaming at that time. Thus Vodafone KK in Japan focused their main nation-wide poster and TV and other media campaign on about 0.1% of the Japanese market (and about 0.02% of Vodafone KK’s accessible market, given Vodafone KK’s approx. 20% market share) – less than a niche. (The reason we know how many roaming customers DoCoMo had at that time, is because one of Vodafone KK’s competitors in Japan engaged our company Eurotechnology Japan KK to analyze Japan’s roaming market, and help our client to develop strategy to better compete with Vodafone KK’s roaming products, which were aggressively marketed, and the core of Vodafone KK’s marketing focus).

Another example was Vodafone KK’s strategic focus on Japan’s prepaid market (find detailed statistics and market shares and analysis of Japan’s prepaid market in our JCOMM report). In 2006 there were about 2.6 million prepaid mobile phone customers in Japan, i.e. about 2.7% of the market, while DoCoMo had about 45,200 prepaid subscribers, i.e. about 0.09% of DoCoMo’s subscribers were prepaid customers. Since the prepaid market in Europe (especially Italy where about 1/2 of the market is prepaid) is extremely important and highly profitable, Vodafone decided on the strategy to focus strongly on the development and growth of Japan’s prepaid market. Almost at the same time however, a national campaign started in Japan linking unregistered and illegally traded prepaid mobile phones to crime, and a law was proposed in Japan’s parliament to outlaw any type of prepaid mobile phones. Thus Vodafone KK found itself on the one hand promoting and investing to develop prepaid mobile phone services in Japan, developing, purchasing (as was the business model in Japan at that time) and bringing to market special prepaid handsets, and organizing national media campaigns promoting Vodafone prepaid mobile phones, while at the same time on the other hand facing the possibility that Japan’s parliament would outlaw these same prepaid mobile phones, and a broad press and TV national discussion on how prepaid mobile phones are linked to crime. The end result was, that instead of outlawing prepaid mobile phones, it was decided to introduce far stricter registration requirements and ID requirements for mobile phones and especially for prepaid mobile phones, and the unauthorized/unregistered sale or transfer of prepaid mobile phones in Japan was made a crime. The end effect for Vodafone of course was a commercial failure of Vodafone’s prepaid mobile phone campaign, in addition to a general decrease of ARPU (average revenue per user).

Instead of focusing on its core business in Japan, Vodafone KK focused management resources, and other resources to try to influence political decisions concerning 2.7% of the market: Japan’s minute and decreasing prepaid market.

Vodafone had many other management issues in Japan, which included recruitment and personality and retain issues of top executives, many kinds of HR issues, management issues at the retail stores, handset planning issues, branding and brand management issues, localization issues and much more.

As a consequence of these and other factors, Vodafone KK’s market share continuously decreased, subscribers moved from Vodafone KK to DoCoMo and KDDI/au, and the financial performance of Vodafone KK deteriorated, in the end convincing Vodafone that the best option was to sell Vodafone’s Japan operations and terminate business activities in Japan.

You can find further details and statistics, financial performance and market share data during this period in our Softbank report and in our JCOMM report.

Copyright 2014 Eurotechnology Japan KK All Rights Reserved

Categories
Economics energy

Japan new energy policy creates opportunities for renewables, smart grid and more – interview by The Economist

Japan energy policy: interview for The Economist on YouTube

by Gerhard Fasol

Japan energy policy – interview outline:

Japan energy policy Question: Is the new energy policy of Japan’s Government an appropriate response to the situation or a missed opportunity

Answer summary:The Government in its new strategy summarizes Japan’s energy situation and proposes a cocktail of different energy sources. Everyone knows that Prime Minister Abe is pro-nuclear energy, but that does not mean that he is against other energy sources, such as renewables. The new energy strategy paper though misses KPIs, Key Performance Indicators. There are no many numerical targets.

Japan energy policy Question: It is often repeated that Japan is poor in energy sources, is this true?

Answer summary:Yes, that is often repeated without thinking, and thats also the case in the introduction of the new policy paper. This is only true as long as we restrict our view to traditional carbon based primary energy sources such as oil, gas, or coal. But if we widen the view to renewables such as wind, water, solar, biomass, and geo-thermal energy sources, then Japan is actually very rich in primary energy sources, and could even aim for energy self-sufficiency. Off-shore wind alone would be sufficient to make Japan energy self-sufficient.
Just by repeating the statement many times, that Japan is poor in energy sources, does not make this statement true.

The new energy policy paper also starts out by saying the Japan is poor in primary energy sources. This is not true if we widen the view to renewable energy sources.

Japan energy policy Question: Re-engineering the electricity grid. Can you explain the concept?

Answer summary:The electricity grid has evolved over many years, maybe 100-150 years. The traditional architecture of the electricity grid is a top-down one-way distribution network from large central power station such as large coal-, gas- or oil-fired power stations or nuclear power stations, to consumers. The traditional electricity grid is similar to the arteries in the human body, where there is the heart in the center, and the arteries distribute the blood to the extremities. This traditional top-down grid has served us very well for a long time, but the time as come now to evolve the grid to the next stage. There will be more distributed power generation, which feed in electricity in the opposite direction from the extremities, and there will be more intelligence in the grid.

Japan energy policy Question: How do you see Japan deal in the future with supply and demand management, how do you see electricity prices evolve in Japan?

Answer summary:With the liberalization there will be more flexibility in the pricing of electricity and supply and demand management. Prices will not necessarily go down, but will depend much more on the timing of demand, on demand/supply management, or on the value of electricity. For example, mission critical electricity consumers such as data centers or hospitals will need a different type of electricity supply, than washing machines in households. Demand/supply management and smart grid will manage the timing of less critical electricity usage.

Economist briefing “Keeping the lights on – deregulation, new and renewables and Japan’s energy mix” handouts

Copyright 2014 Eurotechnology Japan KK All Rights Reserved

Categories
Japan Market Entry M&A

NASDAQ quit Japan in 2002, and London Stock Exchange quit Japan in 2012 for similar reasons. Read why.

NASDAQ and London Stock Exchange both hope to build stock markets in Japan. And both failed for similar reasons and with similar end results

by Gerhard Fasol

NASDA and LSE: in both cases the stock markets NASDAQ and LSE created are still continuing business in Japan after there departure

Initially, London Stock Exchange and Tokyo Stock Exchange created Tokyo-AIM as a joint-venture company in order to create a jointly owned and jointly managed AIM Stock Market in Tokyo, modeled according to the very successful London-AIM model.

“Tokyo Stock Exchange has learnt enough from the London Stock Exchange to set up a similar market on its own” NIKKEI on March 26, 2012

However, on March 26, 2012 NIKKEI reported that “Tokyo Stock Exchange has learnt enough from the London Stock Exchange to set up a similar market on its own. TSE plans to improve the rules of its own new market, so that TSE can create a more welcoming market” (our translation of the original Japanese NIKKEI article to English).

LSE withdrew from the Tokyo AIM joint venture, and sold all to Tokyo Stock Exchange

London Stock Exchange withdrew from the venture, and Tokyo Stock Exchange took over 100% of Tokyo-AIM. Essentially, London Stock Exchange AIM’s venture into Japan failed, while the stock market created by the venture continues without London Stock Exchange’s involvement. As explained in our blog here, these events are very very similar to what happened with NASDAQ about 10 years earlier!

In 2012 Tokyo AIMS’s name was changed to TOKYO PRO Market and TOKYO PRO-BOND Market

In 2012, the name was changed from Tokyo-AIM, to TOKYO PRO Market and TOKYO PRO-BOND Market. Details can be found here:

Some background about the mistakes which led to the failure of both NASDAQ and London Stock Exchange AIM to build business in Japan can be found here:

Copyright 2014 Eurotechnology Japan KK All Rights Reserved

Categories
Economics

Abenomics – and – Why did Japan stop growing?

Professor Takeo Hoshi, Professor of Economics at Stanford, about Abenomics success probability

Abenomics success probability is 12%, 88% probability of failure

Takeo Hoshi, Professor at Stanford University, who devotes his life to work on Japan’s economy at US Universities, gave a talk at the Swedish Embassy organized by the Stockholm School of Economics on Monday, October 21, 2013 entitled:

Will Abenomics restore Japan’s growth?

Outline:

  1. What is Abenomics?
  2. Will Abenomics restore growth?
    • Why did Japan stop growing?
    • Will Abenomics succeed in regenerating growth?
Professor Takeo Hoshi, Stanford University
Professor Takeo Hoshi, Stanford University

Summary – Abenomics success probability:

Professor Hoshi explained that Abenomics is essentially nothing new, its the classical response for a Government to take a country out of recession. However, monetary policy cannot restore growth – in order to restore growth structural reform is needed.

Why did Japan stop growing? Until 1990-1995, Japan was in catch-up mode, catching up with the more technologically and economically advanced Western countries, like European countries and US. Catching up was relatively straightforward, because Japan’s Government could look which industries were most successful and most important in US and Europe, e.g. car industry and electronics industry, and steel making, and then implemented these industries in Japan. However, as soon as Japan had reached the same stage of development as Western countries, Japan’s economic growth stopped, because different methods were necessary, and they seem to be lacking in Japan. So Japan stopped growing around 1990-1995, and has not grown since.

Growth strategy is the “third arrow” of Prime Minister Abe’s Abenomics. Professor Hoshi explains that a growth strategy is nothing new, but every Japanese Government of recent years had a growth strategy, but nothing happened because the implementation did not happen – implementation is the key. Abenomics’ “third arrow” lists more than 100 growth areas, however, Professor Hoshi sees a lack of priorities, too much Government directionalism, and a lack of strong Key Performance Indicators (PKI’s).

When asked during Q&A how high Professor Hoshi estimates the chances for the success of Abenomics, Professor Hoshi said that he estimates that the probability for success of Abenomics is about 12%, and the probability of failure is about 88%. The most likely scenario according to Professor Hoshi is that something similar will happen as under Prime Minister Koizumi, about 1% economic growth

What is Abenomics:

Three arrows:

  1. Expansionary monetary policy
  2. Flexible fiscal policy
  3. Growth strategy

Prime-Minister Abe replaced Shirakawa by Kuroda as Governor of the Bank of Japan, who introduced quantitative and qualitative easing, and an inflation target of 2% within 2 years in order to overcome “deflation” (which in Japan can have two distinct meanings, see below).

Fiscal Stimulus:

Fiscal stimulus was provided by supplementary budgets, financed by new Government bond issues.

Fiscal consolidation plan:

The medium term fiscal consolidation plan aims to:

  1. reduce the budget deficit to 3.3% of GDP by FY2015, to half the level of FY2010, and
  2. to eliminate the budget deficit by FY2020.

If the 2013-2022 economic growth rate is 3.4% per year, 1. (reduction of budget deficit 10 3.3% by FY2015) will be achieved, but 2. (elimination of budget deficit by FY202) will not be achieved.
If the 2013-2022 growth rate is 1.3% per year, neither 1. nor 2. will be achieved.

Growth strategy

The “Japan revitalization strategy” (JAPAN IS BACK) was approved by the cabinet on June 14, 2013, and provides:
3% average nominal economic growth
2% average annual real growth
YEN 1.5 million increase in nominal national income per person

Three action plans:

  1. Industry revitalization plan
  2. Strategic market creation plan
  3. Strategy of global outreach

Overcoming “deflation”?

Abenomics aims to overcome “deflation”. Deflation really has two meanings:

  • Falling prices, because of low demand for goods and services
  • Economic stagnation in combination with falling prices

In Japanese policy discussions, usually “deflation” has the second meaning – thus its important to restore growth in order to eliminate “deflation”.

Is Abenomics new?

Not really. It is the standard policy to get out of recession and to restore growth. Its a combination of demand policy and a supply side policy for growth. What is new in Japan is that until Abenomics, the Bank of Japan did not expand aggressively, and it could be new in Europe, where fiscal austerity is a problem.

Why did Japan stop growing?

Mainly because Japan’s catch-up phase with Western countries has been a success, and Japan reached the same level of technology and economic development as Western countries around 1990-1995. The catch-up was straightforward by imitating in combination with lower wages. As soon as Japan reached the same level of development as Western countries, Japan’s economic growth stopped.

However, US and UK and other Western countries continue high growth of GDP even at high levels of economic development, while Japan does not.

Why does Japan grow much less than US, EU and other Western countries?

  1. Because Japan’s population is aging more rapidly than Western countries, because of lower fertility rates and lack of immigration
  2. Because the export led growth has reached its limits, and internal growth would be necessary
  3. Because Japan’s Government make policy mistakes:
    1. Japan’s Government protects zombie companies, that hurt allocation of capital and productivity
    2. Regulatory policies impaired productivity growth
    3. Macroeconomic policy mistakes

Will Abenomics restore Japan’s economic growth?

Fiscal policy cannot restore economic growth, only structural reform can – thus Abenomics’ “third arrow” is the important one.

Japan revitalization strategy – too many areas, too little focus, fuzzy Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)

Prime Minister Abe’s revitalization strategy has three action plans:

  1. Industry revitalization plan
  2. Strategic market creation plan
  3. Strategy of global outreach

Regulatory reform aims to reduce the costs of doing business, to stop protecting zombies, and “special zone” policies.

Trade agreement talks are held with under the TPP program and with the EU to open up Japan’s economy to global competition.

Macroeconomic policies aim to stabilize the Japanese Government debt and to stop “deflation”.

According to Professor Hoshi, the Prime Minister Abe’s Revitalization Strategy has around 150 different action areas, and some of them are very good ideas, but others are terrible.

In particular Professor Hoshi criticizes that there are far too many action areas, and there is a lack of clear priorities and a lack of focus. It would be better to select fewer priority areas, and take strong effective action in these most important areas.

Professor Hoshi also sees a return to Government selection of “winning industries”. Unlike the time, when there was no internet, and when growth was a matter of copying the US or UK, Government today is in no better position than private industry to know which industries are which are likely to be the winners of the future.

One of the worst examples is the “Cool Japan” initiative: as soon as the Government supports anything, its not “cool” anymore, says Professor Hoshi.

Abenomics- Lack of strong Key Performance Indicators (KPI): only 19% of reform areas have any numerical KPI within 5 years

Growth strategies need clear numerical Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) – for many areas there are no KPIs at all, for others the KPIs are fuzzy and ill-defined (e.g. “Japan will become the most innovative country in the world”), or the KPI target date is so far in the future, that it is irrelevant for the current Prime Minister or the current Government, e.g. 2020.

Of 52 reform areas in the Government’s growth strategy program:

  • 10 areas have no KPIs at all, i.e. the Government cannot measure if any progress is achieved at all in these areas
  • Only 10 of 52 areas (only 19%) have any numerical KPI within 5 years.
  • In many cases the KPIs are ill-defined and fuzzy: e.g. “Japan to become the most innovative country in the world”, or target dates in 2020, i.e. irrelevant and out of the responsibility of the current Government and the current Prime Minister

Special zones – risk to redistribute economic activity geographically within Japan with zero net effect.

Special zones where regulations and approval conditions are relaxed are ideas which have been floated for a long time in Japan. The disadvantage of “special deregulated zones” is that economic activity is just redistributed in Japan, moving from regulated zones to deregulated “special zones” with zero net effect on Japan’s economy, or even increasing the total cost of doing business in Japan.

Abenomics – Reheated pizza?

In conclusion of his talk, Professor Hoshi showed the following slide, which shows the vision of a transition from present Japan (left) to the Japan of the Future (right):

Professor Takeo Hoshi at the conclusion of his talk shows Prime Minister Koizumi's plan for
Professor Takeo Hoshi at the conclusion of his talk shows Prime Minister Koizumi’s plan for “Japan in the future” from 2001

The image of this slide is from Prime Minister Koizumi’s revitalization plan of 2001, i.e. 12 years ago. Professor Hoshi uses this slide to make the point that in his view not much has changed since 2001, that Prime Minister’s Abe’s revitalization plan is not very different from Prime Minister Koizumi’s revitalization plan 12 years ago, and he remains skeptical of Abenomics and its chances for success.

Abenomics success – Q & A

Q. What is the probability for Abenomics to succeed?

A. I was asked this question previously and from the top of my head I instinctively answered that Abenomics has about 10% probability to succeed. I got intrigued, and sat down to work through a decision tree of different policies, and the result was: Abenomics has 12% probability to succeed, and 88% probability of failure

Q. What do you think is the most likely scenario?

A. Something like what happened under Prime Minister Koizumi. About 1% economic growth, but not 2%-3%

Q. Management of Japanese companies?

A. Many major Japanese companies pile up too much cash, should invest more, and pay more to shareholders.

Copyright 2013 Eurotechnology Japan KK All Rights Reserved

Categories
Economics Japan Market Entry Leadership

High-tech market entry to Japan: new opportunities versus old mistakes (Stanford University lecture)

Success stories vs failure. Why some foreign companies succeed in Japan’s high tech sector, and why others fail.

High-tech market entry to Japan: Stanford University Japan Technology Center lecture by Gerhard Fasol

New opportunities vs old mistakes – foreign companies in Japan’s high-tech markets
Stanford University lecture, given on October 28th, 1999

This lecture was given on October 28th, 1999 to an audience of Stanford University faculty, students, post-docs and alumni working in Silicon Valley firms. Although this lecture is now some time ago, much of what was said still is true today. As an example, our recognition of the interplay of “old Japan” vs “new Japan” is still extremely relevant today, with old traditional corporations coexisting with new venture start-ups, some of which, like SoftBank and Rakuten have grown to very large size even on a global scale.

Stanford University Japan Technology Center lecture: outline

(note that some statistical data have changed since this lecture was given, the main change is the growth of China, for example today Japan is not the second, but the third largest economy after China).

  • Why is Japan important?
    • Japan is the world’s second largest market
    • 60%-70% of Asia’s economy is in Japan
    • 10%-20% of the world’s internet/telecom/e-commerce markets are in Japan
    • Some important recent high-tech breakthroughs come from Japan, e.g. blue LED and lasers)
    • For US corporations Japan is in general the most important/largest foreign market & competitor & partner
  • “Old Japan” versus “New Japan”
    • The “old official Japan” may fade into irrelevance, large sections (60%) of Japanese society were excluded from equal access to the “old Japan”, e.g. women, Korean residents, foreign nationals, “half”-people….
    • A “new Japan” is emerging: e.g. Nichia, SoftBank, Don Quichote, etc
    • Education is a major problem
    • Foreign corporations should tune into the “new Japan” new
  • Opportunities which never existed before
    • Foreign corporations for the first time ever can hire top Japanese performers
    • For the first time ever foreign corporations can acquire Japanese corporations on a meaningful scale
  • Some typical mistakes of foreign companies in Japan
    • Manage Asia from Singapore or Hong-Kong (thats like managing All-Europe operations from Tel-Aviv or Reykjavik)
    • Hire the wrong people (wrong Japan-CEO, wrong peronnel, e.g. too much emphasis on English vs true performance or technical excellence)
    • Partnerships or joint ventures with wrong partners or wrong expectations
    • Enter Japan, build R&D labs etc without first planning strategy and aims
    • Forget to do the homework (there is Gigabytes of information you better learn about Japan before you start, training on the job increases risks)
    • Be too fascinated by cherry blossoms & be too optimistic or too pessimistic about Japan
    • Taking things for granted in Japan, which are not:
      • brand recognition
      • Japanese consumer & customer habits and needs
      • Assume global corporations have the same depth as you are used to elsewhere in the world

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